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Ramesh Thakur 
The search for security and prospenty m Asia Pacific cnntinues apace. International 
relations in the Pacific have lacked the institutional structu田sin which the Euro-Atlantic 
partnership is embedded The multilateral structure across the Atlantic has also finnly 
anchored an American presence m Europe. The strategic rationale for US presence in the 
Pacific has never been as stark and simple, and the cultural and pnlitical divides across 
Asia Pacific are deeper and more variegated. The security order of the region is caught 
between an anachronistic Cold War framework and embryonic, untested regional 
approaches Equally, though, the conceptual apparatus of secunty analysts is also caught 
between an anachronistic 20th century framework and newly arising but as yet inchoate 
approaches. In this paper, as part of the effort to develop these propositions, I test the 
approach of global public goods borrowed from economics I will first recapitulate its 
meaning, then seek to apply it to the security architecture of Asia-Pacific from within the 
traditional security paradigm, and finally test its utility against evolving concepts of 
security in the new millennium 
Global Public Goods (GPG) 
I shall follow Inge Kaul fairly closely m my usage of the concept of global public 
goods.山 Shedistingmshes between pnvate and public goods in tenns of their tradability 
t Tlds paper exp，山田thepersoaal opi11io11s of the author, aud does 101 uecessarily reflect the 1•iews 
of11IeU11即dNat削 ISUuiversity. 
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m markets The transaction of private goods is governed by the price mechanism, the 
operation of 、Nhichcan result in the transfer of ownership of the gocd concerned Private 
goods are the田foreexcludable and rival in consumption. By contrast, public goods, like 
a street sign or air, are neither excludable nor rival Rational behaviour by private actors 
encourages free-riding on public goods precisely because they are non excludable and 
non-rival: why pay for something if it is goin呂田 beprovided by another actor and you 
cannot be prevented from enjoying its benefits for freeワInturn, however, this can lead to 
problems of over-use (the so called tragedy of the commons), under-use or under-supply 
The solution to these problems hes in some form of collective action mechanisms, in the 
absence of which we risk producing outcomes of ‘public badピlikeenvironmental 
degradation Finally, she defines global public goods (GPG) as下ublicgoods whose 
benefits reach across borders, generations, and population groups’，・ '" regional public 
goods are confined to particular regions. To say that peace is indivisible is to say that 1 is 
a GPG: If peace broke out we would al enjoy its benefits as no one group or region 
could be excluded 
2. The Traditional Security Architecture of Asia-Pacific 
2.1 Tile End oftlie Cold War 
One axis of the Cold War consisted of the mutual hostility between the United States 
and the Soviet Union as supe叩owers,the second axis was a transcendental con日ICtthat 
divided the world into two groups of states The Cold War conflict was a global struggle 
centred on and dominated by two superpowers who we目 ableto structu日 thepattern of 
international relat旧nshipsbecause of a qualitative disc肥pancyin military capacity and 
resources. And the conflict was transcendental because it involved a clash of ideologies: 
the existence of a strong Marxist and capitalist state that could not accept permanent 
日lationswith each other, believing instead in the eventual destruction of the other. The 
ideological con日＜Ctis over and the mutual deterrence structure of the Cold War penod is 
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now obsolete. 
The framework for the world order resting on superpower rivalry was adopted at 
Yalta in 1945. Reflecting the two theat問Sof the Second World War, that order had two 
geogn甲hicalcomponents: Europe and Asia Pacific. The principal elements of the 
European order included.'" 
・Themaintenance of Soviet strategic and political dominance over Eastern Europe; 
• The perception by West Europeans that the overwhelming and proximate power 
presence of the Soviet Umon in Eastern Europe was a threat to their security; 
・Thewish of the Ww Europeans to maintain a visible and structu日dalliance with 
the United States for the maintenance of security that was no longer attamable 
through the pu陀lyEuropean balance of power; 
• The reinforcement of alliance ti田 bycommon interests and values of other kmds 
which helped to absorb the strains caused by differences in policy and interests; 
and 
• The acceptance of the solution of the problem of German power-which had caused 
two world wars by the physical d川sionof Germany along the Cold War axis. 
The Yalta based order for Europe has crumbled, but not for Asia Pacific. NATO 
叩 largementand the air strik田 onSerbia symbolically rubbed Russia's nose in the dirt of 
its historic Cold War defeat. In Asia-Pacific, by contrast, walls have not come tumbling 
down, Korea is stil divided, empires have not dissolved nor come apart, and armies have 
not gone marching home. 
There is a greater variety of polttical systems in Asia-Pacific, ranging from robust 
and explosive democracy in India and fragile democracies in Bangladesh, Nepal and the 
Philippines and something less than full democracies m many other countries, to 
commumsm m three countnes In addtt1on to endunng low-mtenstty msurg叩口es,many 
countries are characterised by socio-economic fragility and regime brittleness. The 
dispar山田msocial and economic indicato四 aregreater in Asia. 
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Internal developments in the former Soviet Union had immediate and far-reaching 
consequences for Eastern Europe but lacked a simtlar resonance in the Asian communist 
countries. Communism in Eastern Europe was installed and maintained by the barrel of 
Soviet Red Army guns. Its durabtlity in Asian countries flows partly from its fusion with 
nationalism. Hence the domino effect of the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union 
on the satellite regimes in Eastern Europe in contrast to the capacity for independent 
survival of the Asian communists 
European achievements in arms control and disarmament have not been matched by 
comparable movement on Asian-Pacific fronts. We may be witnessing an叩wards
trajectory in military spendmg once more, from South through Southeast to East Asia 
Aロnsbuildups reflect the existence of more multiple sources of threat to the peace and 
stability of Asia-Pacific than of Europe. The kaleidoscope of cultu日s,cleavages and 
conflicts m Asia-Pacific does not permit a simple intercontinental transposition of the 
Euro Atlantic security architecture 
2.2 The Lead Players 11 Asia and the Pacific 
The structure of power relations in the Asia-Pacific region JS more fluid and 
complex than in Europe, restmg on日vepowers・ America, China, Japan, Russia and 
India 
As part of the Cold War struggle, both bloc leade四 hadbeen prepared to underwrite 
the security and stability of their respective camps That is, they were symmetric 
hegemons who bore the costs of the trans alliance security as a public good. In the trans 
Atlantic security architecture, this was embedded in NATO. The collapse of the old order 
necessitated a triple change in NATO in membersh中（enlargement),geographic scope 
(exp叩 sioneastwards) and role （仕omdefence of Western Europe agamst a Soviet attack 
to the mo問 diffusep田cemamtenance in Europe）ーThewar in Kosovo in 1999 validated 
al three changes But because there was no comparable single Cold War dividing line 
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across Asia and no rival multilateral military organisations in Asia-Pacific, the end of the 
Cold War has had a somewhat more confusing impact on the security GPG he肥 Russia
has faded from the scene as a間cuntyguarantor (or public good provider) for members 
of its alliance. 
2.2.1. The United Stαtes 
The situation with regard to the United States is anything but clear. It has no peer 
competitor as a provider of public goods in the world at large, across the Atlantic and 
across Asia-Pacific. It is in no position to impose Pax Americana. But equally, no m句or
world problem can be settled by working against the U即日dStates Washington will 
remain reliant on coalit旧nswhose membe目hipmay shift from issue to issue and陀gion
to region, but whose core will consist of NATO alies, Japan and other ‘like-minded’ 
democracies. 
The United States is the de facto guarantor of the Asia Pacific s田urityorder, and 
Okinawa is the geopnlitical epicentre of the US military presence in East Asia If alies 
are prepared to accept問sponsibilityfor the defence of home territories to the best of 
their abilities against the backdrop of a strategic‘over-the honzon' US military pr回ence,
then a continued US commitment to the peace and se印 rityof Asia-Pacific will meet US 
interests and disposition. More important than a resident US military presence is a 
credible surge capacity by such means as prepositioning of equipment and prior 
agreements with potential host governments for launching and sustaining US military 
operations. 
Like Europe, Asia-Pacific is caught between the desire to keep the US fully engaged 
in the region to underwrite stability and prosperity, and the search for a sharper and 
autonomous regional identity Most regional governments do acknowledge that the 
Pacific security framework established by the United States has been an important shield 
behind which they have pursued their search for peace and prosperity. In their view, the 
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continued strategic engagement of the United States will remain the cornerstone of 
Asian-Pacific security. It is not that the regional governments trust or love America the 
most Rather, they fear America the least. An important reason for this is that most 
analysts do interpret the US military role in the region as providing a GPG一一間gional
security-rather than in pll百uitof national security at the price of regional order 
2.2.2.Japan 
The two potential intra-regional stabilising powers-subsidiary regional public 
goods (RPG) providers-are China and Japan. The United States is the biggest. richest, 
most productive, most innovative and the best balanced economy in the world. Japan iお
the world’s largest single source of su中lussavings, the world’s biggest capital investor 
and aid donor, and the world’s leader in the organisation and technology of 
manufacturing America is the most universal and Japan the most singular of modern 
societies. 
Japan was one of the chief bene日ciariesof the Cold War, during which W出 hington
allowed Japanese exporters generous entry mto its markets in return for aはrategic
partnership in an Asia dominated by two communist giants. The larger geopolitical 
circumstances were such that Washington acquiesced in an叩 dervaluedyen, non 
reciprocal open markets to Japanese exports, technology transfers to Japan, and an 
abdication of responsibility for defence and foreign policy to the US. The disp' rate and 
sometimes conflictmg US Japan mterests have been held together by a complex, 
multidimensional and growing web of relationships. A militarily resurgent Japan would 
send ripples of anxiety around many Asian-Pacific countries even in the absence of any 
indications of hostile intent Turning apprehension into reassurance wtll depend 
ultimately on whether neighbours view Japanese contributions to regional security as 
being a GPG or a self-interested aggrandisement. 
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2.2.3. China 
The pivot of the Asia-Pacific security order in the foreseeable future will be the 
China-Japan-US triangle The Chinese argue that a political role for China ts welcomed 
by Asian Pacific countries as a counter to US military muscle and Japan’s economic 
dominance. Sinologists argue that China acts on the adage that one mountain cannot 
accommodate two tigers. Beijing’s policy is described as one of restra旧mgJapan and 
constraining India, its only serious Asian rivals 同 Acore element of Chtnese nationalism, 
reinforced by the NATO attack on the Chinese Embassy to Belgrade, is its‘self-image as 
a victimised developing nation’山Twoalternative scenarios may be postulated: 
・SinoJapanese rivalry, with the US as the balancer which deters China and 
問strainsJapan：，耐
・SinoUS bipolarity, with China dominating the mainland and the US controlling 
the seas In this scenario, Japan essentially plays second fiddle within the alliance 
with Washington."' 
Sino US問lationsstruck rough seas in 1999-20口Othat left the rhetoric of a strategic 
partnership of l卯8as a fading memory China was disillusioned by the firming of the 
US-Japan alliance, the prospects of a TMD system for Northeast Asia and Clinton’s 
(passtng) inability to cut a deal on the terms of China’s WTO membership. Washington 
was rocked by charges of sustained and successful Chinese spying on US nuclear secrets, 
Beijing’s failure to control North Korean missile capabilities and continuing export of 
proliferation-sensitive matenal and equipment to Pakistan, and apparent reversals on 
human rights. China denounced the NATO air strikes on Serbia as ilegal agg町田ionon a 
sovereign state. The bombing of the Chtnese Embassy in Belgrade was旧te中retedas a 
deliberate attempt to weaken and humiliate China In Beijin正日 view,China問mainsthe 
principal obstacle to US hegemony in Asia, hence the US determination to under『nine
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China 
Western perceptions of China tend to osc11late between the extrem田 ofconfrontation 
and fascination. Contemporary inte甲retationsof Chma as the emerging superpower 
produce two opposite Jines of analysis. The benign view sees China taking its rightful 
place in the management of regional and world order. The more pessimistic assessment 
worri田 aboutChina’s potential for mischief as an ascendant and assertive power. Cluna 
at war would be a regional public bad, probably also a global public bad Peace cannot be 
maintained in Asia without accommodating China's interests. But nor will it be durable if 
based principally on a policy of appeasement. The trick will be to strike the nght balance 
between containment and appeasement. Asian-Pacific governments remain keen to 
integrate China more fully mto open regional and global trading arrangements, to 
‘domesticate’1t into the Asian family of nations 
2.2.4. Russia 
Russia has not been an active player in Asia Pacific, being too preoccupied with 
internal affairs to worry much about its proper role in Asia-Pacific. Yet Russia is a 
Eurasian country, with almost 60 percent of its total territory lying in Asia. It could yet 
ex出 significantinfluence in the region either through economic-political問covery,or 
through total collapse. Russia as a failed s回tewould be tantamount to a Somalia with 
nukes at the heart of the Asia-Pacific region: a global public bad and a regional public 
disaster. Powers rise and fal as part of the unfolding process of history. One of the 
intriguing gaps in the theoretical hterature of International Relations is indicators that 
would help us to identify a disappearing g問atpower while it is disappearing. 
The fonner Soviet Union’S Central Asian republics have been detached from Euro戸
While some neighbours might serve as condmts for impoロinginstability into C叩 tral
Asia, most are worried about the spillover effects of any failed state. The volatility, 
instability and religious ferment around the Central Asian crescent also highlight the 
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shifting locus of fundamen回listte汀'Orismfrom the Middle East to Southwe't Asia. 
2 .2.5 India 
India has consequently become a frontline state in the global fight agamst inter百ational
terrorism. Its identity as an Asian-Pacific (as distinct from Asian) country is stil 
evolving. Four years ago, I argued that India was neither powerful enough to bully, rich 
enough to bribe nor principled enough to inspt回開NowIndia is a self-declared possessor 
of nuclear weapons, has achieved impressive economic growth rates for several 
consecutive ye唄rs,is being increasingly acknowledged as an emergmg powerhouse in 
information technology, and has been visited by many world leaders Nevertheless, lndta 
is stil distracted by the Kashmir dispute and restricted by Pakistan to being a 
subcontinental power, it has litle of substance m bilateral relationship' with the other 
two Asi叩 giantsChina and Japan, its per captta income level is stil firmly in the middle 
range of the developing countries’average, and its mternational influence is well below 
the peaks attained during the golden age of the 1950s under Jawaharlal Nehru. 
23. Incipient Regio11alism 
Kaul notes that the United Nations ts‘an inte町】ediateGPG’．‘one required to produce 
such final GPGs as peace and secunty or global justice and balanced development，同
Obviously the same holds true of regional organisations a la regional public goods. The 
political infrastructure to sustain peace and prosperity m Asia Pacific includes the 
network of dialogue and consultations al問adyin existence. The most substantial forum is 
ASEAN, including the post ministerial conference with dialogue partners and, more 
receotly, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARP). 
The ARF is stil m its infancy. It is well placed to serve as the consolidating and 
legitimating instrument for regional security initiatives and confidence building 
measures. It ts on public record as supporting such measures as the UN arms陀gister,
IO 
exchanges of unclassi日edmili回『yinfonnation, maritime security cooperat旧n,regional 
peacekeeping, preventive diplomacy and non proliferation. When we consider how 
painfully difficult it has been for Europe, a well-established economic and political 
entity, to manage the conflicts in fonner Yugoslavia, our expectations of the ARF as a 
conflict management institution must remain modest. Asia is both more diverse than 
Europe and lacks the ballast and texture of the theory, history and practice of European 
cooperation and integration 
Yet in one respect two of the Asian Pacific subregions, namely Southeast Asia and 
the South Pacific, have managed to achieve what Europeans have been talking about for 
decades, namely a nuclear weapon－仕eezone. NWF7 are integral components of the 
mosaic of international action on the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons. By 
maintaining the momentum for the continued stigmatisation of this weapon of mass 
destruction, NWF7 sustain the structure of normative restraints on the acquisition, 
multiplication, deployment, and use of nuclear weapons. They help to embed and 
institutionalise the global no叩roliferationnonn at the regional level. Where there is a 
prospect of the deployme it of nuclear weapons in new and sensitive areas, a NWF7 can 
instnute a safe corridor between the nuclear weapons of contending rivals Thus they take 
away nuclear weapons from any future security architecture being contemplated for the 
region concerned. Although such zones have been proposed for South Asia and Northeast 
Asia, their prospects cannot be said to be very bright. 
From a GPG perspective, there are two pertinent comments First, there is an 
abundance (over-supply) of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, with the 
resulting public bad of heightened tension and prospects of devastation on a mass scale. 
Second, the absence of an appropriate regional organisation as an intermediate GPG 
makes the問alisationof a GPG outcome a NWFZ which is both non-excludable and 
non-rival, with benefits being shared by al in the region (and beyondト－thatmuch mo問
difficult. Both the South Pacific and Southeast Asia, like Latin American before and 
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Africa more or less contemporaneously, were helped greatly by having the South Pacific 
Forum, ASEAN, the Organisation of Amencan States (OAS) and the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU) as the initiating, negotiating, endo日ingand legitimating organisat10田
Unlike the security sector, the pace of regionalism as an intermediate GPO has 
picked up somewhat on the economic front. The winds of market integration have been 
blowing across Asia-Pacific even through the financial crisis, perhaps to some extent 
fanned by it. Approved measures include a deepening of tariff cuts with a view to 
eliminating most import charges by 2日02,a dismantling of barriers to foreign investment 
in agriculture, manufacturing and fisheries by 2003, and a pruning of the exempt旧nlist. 
Nevertheless, ASEAN has no ambitions for a customs union or single currency. Regional 
mstttutions and sentiment are conspicuously lacking in Northeast Asia. 
At the ASEAN and ARF gatherings in Thailand in 2000, there were four significant 
developments First, ASEAN decided to institute a new troika mechanism consisting of 
past, present and designated successor chairs. The tl'ika will help to articulate common 
ASEAN positions on international issues and respond to emergencies between summit 
meetings. Second, the日 wasan overdue acknowledgment of cross-border commonalities 
in such ar剖 sas human resources, information technology, education, social safety nets, 
and NGO networks. Third, a new framework of cooperation was adopted under the 
formula of ‘ASEAN plus 3', meaning China, Japan and South Kore羽 Thislinks the two 
sub-regions of East Asia more closely together thar】themore amo中l10usARF Finally, 
the ARF ministerial meeting was historically important in inducting North Ko悶ainto the 
organisation as its 23rd member The two Koreas thus now have an institution to go to 
and an audience to speak to, the only one outside the politically highly charged UN 
forum, for voicing grievances and soliciting support. Slowly, hesitantly-perhaps too 
slowly and hesitantly-embryomc regional institut旧nsin Asia are starting to take on the 
functions of public goods providers. 
12 
2.4 New Eco1101111c Order 
In the qua口ercentury from 1972 to 1997. the East Asian economies produced the 
fastest nse in incomes for the biggest number of peoples in human Iustory. The economic 
success was attributed to several factors: sound economic management by relatively 
stable political regimes which ushe問din rapid structural change, an industrious and 
increasmgly well-educated workforce, and high rates of savings and investment by 
mstinctively thrifty peoples. This was backed by the adoption of a managed market 
strategy of economic development which struck a balance between the mterventionist 
and the free market state. Flushed with economic success, Asia’s long-serving leaders 
grew in self-con日denceand stature to the point、vherethey lectured the West on decaying 
values, pohucal institutions and social cohesion. 
In an article that has gained田町ospectiverespectability, Paul Krugman argued that 
the‘Asian miracle’had no clothes・ it was based on massive inputs of capital and labour, 
not on efficiency gains.'"" The bubble buf't with a currency cnsis that began in Thailand 
m July I 997. No one predicted the ferocity of the market reaction to Thailand’s problems 
or the severity and spread of contagion to the rest of the region As market players 
responded to the herd instinct, the contagion spread quickly to Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Hong Kong and South Korea. The Asian malaise seemed to have laid waste to the Asian 
miracle. 
The af日ictionthat hit Asia was a crisis of governance, reflecting institutionalised 
patronage and corruption, weak central banks and lack of transparency, accountability 
and teeth in regulatory arrangements. As well as providing a vivid illustration of the cnsts 
of‘crony capitalism’ where profits are made not through the free interplay of market 
forces but as a result of access to credit lines and purchasing orders through political 
patronage-the Asian crisis reinforced the benefits of competitive markets, transparent 
and effective regulatory institutions, an efficient and coηuption free bureaucracy, and the 
rule of law 
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The outbreak of the crisis reflected failures of pnlicy and governance at the national 
level; its continuance for a prolonged period was an indictment of regional institutions 
and great-power economic leadership Created to be the chief vehicle for regional 
economic cooperation, APEC made no contnbution at al to the solution of A訂正sfirst 
economic crisis since its birth. When the crunch came, the institutional identity of APEC 
and ASEAN proved to be far too embrγonic and fragile, much too dependent stil on the 
personal p問ferencesand policies of the leade四 atthe top. 
Jn addition, however, the international response to the Asian crisis highlighted 
deficiencies in the architecture of global economic management as well IMF 
prescriptions we陀 contestedon five fronts: for the ‘moral hazard' of inteげermgwith 
market forces by rescuing international creditors from the consequences of bad 
investment decisions; for being excessively叩 ntractionary;for the rigid application of 
doctrinaire田mediesdeveloped m日sponseto a different mix of policy failures in the 
en ti問 lydifferent context of Latin Amenca where gnvernment deficits had been the roots 
of the crisis; for eroding economic sovereignty; and for ignoring the social and political 
contexts and repercussions."" A Japanese economic policy adviser m Jakarta陀 marked
caustically that‘IMF prescript旧nsare desk theories based on statistical figures’（12) 
In other words, some of the intern日diateGPGs at the internattonal level were found 
to be wanting, hence the exacerbation of the regional public bads during the financial 
crisis. Nevertheless, the underlying fundamental strengths of regional economies 
budget surpluses, flexible labour markets, low taxation, low inflation, high domestic 
savings rates, emphasis on education and training, and a strong work ethic-meant that 
the tr recovery and renewal was a matter of when, not whether. But the crisis did highlight 
the need for well functioning regional and international markets as regional and global 
public goods，同spectively,since everyone enjoys their benefits or suffers frnm their lack. 
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3. New Security in the New Millennium 
3.1. Global Govema11ce 
Asia cannot be quarantined from developments taking place elsewhere. The shift 
away from traditional concerns to new approaches is a worldwide phenomenon 10 
secunty studies and policies The business of the world has changed almost beyond 
recogmtion over the course of the last one hundred years. There are many mo田 actors
today, and their patterns of interaction are far more complex. The international policy 
making stage 1s increasingly congested as private and public non-state actors jostle 
alongside national governments in setting and implementing the agenda of the new 
century. The multitude of new actors adds depth and texture to the increasingly rich 
tapestry of international civil society. They also lead to the establishment of ever more 
rules and regimes through multilaterally negotiated agreements which take on the 
character of GPGs, in that once they come into existence, they are non-excludable and 
non-nval. 
In today’s seamless world, political frontiers have become less salient both for 
national governments whose respnns1bilities within borders can be held to interna!Ional 
scrutiny, and for mternational organisations whose rights and duues can extend beyond 
borders. The gradual erosion of the once sacrosanct principle of national sovereignty is 
rooted today in the reality of global interdependence: no countr. is an island unto Itself 
anymo田 Ours1s a world of m句orcities and agglomerations, with nodes of financial and 
economic power and their globally wired transport and communications networks. 
Cumulatively, they span an increasingly interconnected and interactive world characterised 
more by technology driven exchai】geand communication than by territonal borders and 
political separation. 
The meaning and scope of security have become much broader The number and 
types of security providers have grown enormously and the relationship between security 
providers has become more dense and complex. As well as armed 田町mism,for example, 
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states have to contend with eco-te汀onsmand cyber-teπmism. All three are cross-border 
phenomena of global scope and ramifications-that is, they are global public bads-
requiring active collaboration among the defence and constabulary forces, law 
enforcement authorities and non-government groups and organisations Kaul notes that 
the traditional class of GPGs were either matters external to countries, such as the natural 
commons, or‘at-the-bo吋er’issueslike trade tarifs and military security. Today’s global 
agenda deals with issues that cut across and dart between borders, requiring behind-the-
border policy convergence: clean air, health, financial stability, knowledge management, 
etc"" Globalisation means that disease can no longer be confined to national, or even 
contmental, borders. Public health within countries, not to say in aeroplanes, has thus 
become a GPG. Thus do the new security agenda and GPGs converge. 
3 2.From National Security to H111a1 Security 
The shift from the ‘national security’to the ‘human security’paradigm IS of historic 
importance The object of security changes from the state to the individual; the focus 
changes from security through annaments to security through human development, from 
territorial security to food, employment and environmental security The fundamental 
components of human security-the security of people against th問団sto life, health, 
livelihood, pe目onalsafety and human dignity--<:an be put at risk by external aggression, 
but also by facto四 withina country including‘security’forces. Over the course of the 
20th century, 30 million people were killed in international wars, 7 million in civil wa四
and an additional 170 million by their own govemments.1''1 
The traditional, narrow concept of secunty leaves out the most elementary and 
legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives It also 
diverts enonnous amounts of national wealth and human resources into annaments and 
armed forces, while countries fail to protect their c1t1zens frnm chronic insecurities of 
hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment, social conflict and 
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environmental hazards. The annual mortality correlates of Afro-Asiatic poverly-low 
levels of hfe expectancy, high levels of maternal and infant mortality run into several 
million. Annual deaths preventable killings-even on this scale cannot be accommodated 
within the analytical framework of ‘national security’； they can in‘human security’To 
insist on national security at the expense of human security would be to trivialise Jhe 
concept of security in many real world circumstances to the point of sterility, be問ftof 
any practical meaning.1"1 
The narrow definition of security also presents a falsified image of the policy 
process. The military is only one of several competing interest groups vying for a larger 
share of the collective goods being allocated authoritatively by the government 
Environmental and social groups also compete for the allocation of scarce resources. 
Rational policy-makers will allocate resources to security only so long as its marginal 
return is greater th叩 forother uses of the resources. 
Human security gives us also a template for international action Canada and Japan 
are two countries that have taken the lead in attempting to inco叩oratehuman security in 
their foreign policies. A practical exp町田ionof this was the Ottawa Treaty on landmines: 
the日rstto impose a ban on an entire class of weapons already m widespread use. The 
Convention was a triumph for an unusual coalition of governments, mternational 
orgamsations and NGOs. Such ‘New Diplomacy' has been impelled by a growmg 
intensity of public impatience with the slow pace of traditional diplomacy Many people 
have grown tired of years of negotiations leading to a final product that may be accepted 
or rejected by countries.061 They look instead for a sense of urgency and timely action 
that will prevent human insecunty, not always react to outbreaks of con日ict.
3 3.No11-Govern111e11t Orga11isatio11.< (NGOs) 
In recent m句ordiplomatic landmarks like the Ottawa Treaty banning anti-personnel 
landmines, the Rome T陪atyestablishing the International Criminal Court, and humanitarian 
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interventions in Kosovo and East Ttmor, the impact of NGOs on mternational public 
policy has been very evident. The consequence of the rise of NGOs as significant policy-
influencing actors, animated by the deme to curtail and abolish publtc bads and spread 
public goods, is to tilt the balance away from hard to soft security 
There are four broad reasons for the rise of NGO influence. With the end of the Cold 
War, new issu国 likehuman rights, environmental deg悶dationand gender equality came 
to the forefront of public consciousness These are issues on which NGOs enjoy many 
comparative advantages over governments in terms of experience, expertise and public 
credibility. Second, the global scope and multilayered complexity of the new issues 
increased the need for partnerships between the established state actors and proltferating 
NGOs. Third, the opportunities provided to NGOs have expanded enormously as a result 
of modem communicat旧nstechnology that enables people to forge real time cyberspace 
communities on sha陀dinterests, values and goals. Finally, people with special skils and 
expertise have mcreasingly been drawn to work for and with NGOs, thereby muting 
some of their earlier amateurishness. 
The expanding worldwide networks of NGOs embrace virtually every level of 
organisation, from the village community to global summits, and almost every sector of 
public life, from the provision of microcredit and the delivery of paramedical assistance, 
to environmental and human rights activism. Much of the UN’s work in the field 
involves intimate p町田ershipswith dedicated NGOs. 
This is not to imply that states are being replaced by NGOs and international 
organisations. Nor does 1t mean that al NGOs are angels. Instead we must confront, 
address and redress the problem of unelected, unaccountable, unrepresentative and selι 
aggrandising NGOs. They can be just as undemocratic as the governments and 
organisations they cnt1cise, and represent single issue vested interests such as the gun 
lobby. By contrast, most industrialised-country governments are multipurpose 
organisations trying to represent the publtc mterest by the choice of the voters In many 
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developing countries, societies are busy bmlding sound national governments as the 
prerequisite to effective governance: good governance is not possible without effective 
government 
But it does imply that national governments and international organisations will 
have to learn to hve with the rise of NGOs. Indeed those who learn to exploit the new 
opportunities for partnership between the different actors will be among the more 
effective New Age diplomats 
3.4 Human Rights and‘'Humamtarwu lnter同ntion'
NGOs have been especially active, often intrusive and sometimes even obtrusive on 
human rights A right is a claim, an entitlement that may neither be confe汀ednor demed 
A human right, owed to everγperson simply as a human being, is inhe問ntlyuniversal 
Held only by human beings, but equ剖lyby al, it does not flow仕・omany office, rank or 
relationship. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) is the embcdiment and 
the proclamation of the human rights noロn.
While Rwanda stands as the symbol of inaction in the face of genocide, and the 
tragedy of Srebrenica‘will haunt our [UN] history forever', 1川 Kosovoraised many 
questions about the consequences of action when the international commumty is divided 
in the face of a humani阻riantragedy.＂め Whathappens when the different lessons of the 
twentieth century, encapsulated in such slogans as‘No More Wars' and ‘No More 
Auschwitzes,' come into collisionワ
Who decides, following what rules of procedure and evidence, that rnass atrocities 
have been commuted, by which party, and what the appropriate r田ponseshould be: 
I. To respect sovereignty al the time is to be complicit in human-rights violations 
sometimes; 
2. To argue that the UN Security Council must give Its consent to humanitarian war is 
to risk policy paralysis by handing over the agenda to the most egregious and 
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obstreperous; 
3. To use force unilaterally is to violate internattonal law and undermine world order 
The UN Security Council hes at the heart of the international law enforcement 
system. The justtfication for bypassing it to launch an offensive war remains problematic, 
and the precedent that was set remains deeply troubling. The sense of moral outrage 
provoked by humanitarian atrocities must be tempe問dby an appreciation of the limits of 
power, a concern for international institution-building, and a sensitivity to the law of 
unintended consequences 
4. The United Nations as an Intermediate GPG 
It used to be said during the Cold War that the pu中oseof NATO was to keep the 
Americans in, the Germans down and the Russians out. Does Kosovo mark a turning 
point, changing NATO into a tool for keepmg the Amencans in, the Russians down and 
the United Nations out? 
International organisations are an essential means of conducting world affairs mo問
satisfactorily than would be possible under conditions of mtemational anarchy or total 
self-help The United Nations lies at their legislative and normative cent日 Ift did not 
exist, we would surely have to invent it Yet its founding vision of a world community 
equal m rights and united in action is stil to be realised. The global public goods of 
peace, prosperity, sustainable development and good govemance cannot be achieved by 
any country acting on ts own. The United Nations is stil the symbol of our dreams for a 
better world, where weakness can be compensated by justice and fairness, and the law of 
the jungle replaced by the rule of law. 
Success that is sustained requires us al to make a greater commitment to the viston 
and values of the United Nations, and to make systematic use of the UN forum and 
modalities for managing and endmg conflicts People continue to look to the United 
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Nat旧nsto guide them and protect them when the tasks are too big and complex for 
nations and regions to handle by themselves. The comparative advantages of the UN are 
its universal membership, political legitimacy, administrative impartiality, technical 
expert!Se, convening and mobilising power, and the dedication of its staff. Its 
comparative disadvantages are exce'5ive politicisation, ponderous pace of deciS1on-
making, impossible mandate, high cost structure, insufficient resources, bureaucratic 
rigidity, and institutional timidity Many of the disadvantages are the product of demands 
and intrus旧nsby 189 member states who own and control the organisation, but some key 
membe四 disownresponsibility for giving it the requisite support and resources. For the 
U即日dNations to succeed, the world community must match the demands made on the 
organisation by the means given to it. 
5. Conclusion 
The old world order has faded. The new world order is not yet set. The contours of 
Asia Paci日care changing The optim1St1c scenario postulates continuing strengthening of 
cooperative security relations embedded in such regional institutions as APEC and the 
ARF Enhanced interdependence through increasing intra-regional日owsof people, 
goods and services will foster and nest a growing sense of community. The pessimistic 
scenario IS of intensified volatility, turbulence and con日ictbeyond the managerial 
capacity of the embryonic regional institutions. The prophets of doom fear the re 
emergence of old power-political rivalnes, or else the rise of new security threats rnoted 
in田iergy,food and water scarcity. 
From a GPG pe四pective,what is pertinent is the disconnect between the global 
scope of the policy challenges facmg us and the terntorial jurisdictions within which we 
are stil bounded in fonnulating the bulk of our policy responses The United Nations 
represents the idea that unbridled nationalism and the raw inte中layof power must be 
mediated and moderated in an international framework. It is the centre for hannomsing 
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national inte日stsand forging the internattonal interest In the area of hard secunty, only 
the UN can legitimately authorise military action on behalf of the entire international 
community, instead of a select few. But the UN does not have its own military and police 
forces, and a multinational coalition of alltes can offer a more credible and efficient 
military force when robust action is needed and warranted. What will be increasingly 
needed in future is partnerships of the able, the willing and the high一mmdedwith the duly 
authorised. What we should most fear is partnerships of the able, the willtng and the low-
minded in violation of due process. In the new security agenda, similarly, no other 
organisation comes close to matching the mobilising capacity and legitimating authority 
of the United Nations. 
Notes 
(I) Kaul. pp. 296-315. See also Kaul, Grunberg, and Siem. 
(2) Kaul. p. 298. 
(3) DePorle. pp. 243-44. 
(4）恥1aHk.
(5) Bessho. 
(6) Chr;'1ensen. pp. 81 118. 
(7) Ross. pp. 49 80. 
(8) Thakur. 1997. 
(9) Kaul. p. 316 
(I 0) Krugman. 
(11) Thakuc. 1998. 
( 12) Quoted in Japan fo11es, 26 May 1999. 
(13) Kaul. pp. 298-99. 
(14）‘Freedom’s Journey', survey in The Eco11omist, 11September1999. 
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地球公共財とアジアにおける平和と安全保障
〈要約〉
ラメシュ・タクール
この論文は、 20世紀の冷戦時代を反映する従来の安全保障パラダイムから離
れることによって、地域の平和と安全保障を分析する新しいアプローチを開拓
しようとするものである。経済学から借りてきたこの新しいアプローチは、平
和と安全保障を地球公共財とみなす。最初の部分で、本論文は「地球公共財J
を、例外なしに誰もが享受できる万人の利益として定義する。
第2節では、アジア一太平洋地域が、 2つの地理的な構成要素を持っていた
従来の安全保障構造という文脈において、考察される。第二次世界大戦の後に
発達したこの安全保障体制は、ソピエトの脅威を封じ込めようとしていたヨー
ロツパ 大西洋間の協力関係を反映するようになった。このヨーロッパの安全
保障体制がすでに崩壊した一方で、アジアのそれは本質的にそのまま残存して
いる。そのことは、旧ソ連と東ヨーロッパで起こった広範囲にわたる政治的経
済的変化が、アジアの共産主義諸国には及ばなかったということを示している。
そして、、ノ連と東ヨーロツパの共産主義を崩壊させたドミノ効果が、アジアに
おいては見られなかったことを示している。アジアでは共産主義体制がまだ存
在している。さらに、ヨーロッパではかなりの程度の軍備管理と軍備縮小が達
成されたが、アジア 太平洋地域では軍備が拡大された。
本論文はこの節で、この地域における権力関係の構造を考察し、安全と安定
性という地域の公共財を確保する上で重要な5つのプレーヤー（アメリカ合衆国、
中国、日本、ロシアとインド）の各々を分析する。さらに、これらそれぞれの大
国の観点からこの地域の主要傾向を浮き彫りにする。非核地帯構想（NWFZ）と
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地域の経済協力は、安全保障を地球公共財たらしめている特定の主要な地域的
構成要素の一つである。本論文は、南アジアと北東アジアにおける NWFZの見
通しは厳L1ハと指摘する一方で、経済的地域協力に関してはより楽観的である。
アジアの経済危機は、地域の及び地球公共財に対して、よく機能している地域
市場の重要性を強調するために引き合いに出されている。
本論文の第 3節では、グローパル・ガヴァナンス、人間の安全保障、 NGOの
役割、人権と人道的干渉に特に注目することによって、新しい千年紀にグロー
パライゼーションがもたらした新しい問題と関係を探求する。このますます複
雑化し多様化している世界においては、自然の共有財（naturalcommons）、貿易関
税、軍事安全保障という伝統的な地球公共財が、きれいな空気、健康、財政的
安定性、知識管理などへ変容することが要請されている。第4節では、国連が、
中間的な地球公共財であるということが確認される。従って、国連は平和、繁
栄、持続可能な発展とグッド・ガヴァナンスという地球公共財を促進するため
の形態と利点を備えているのであり、国連のヴィジョンと価値へのよりいっそ
うのコミットメントが要請されている。
